Global Imbalances and International Monetary Order

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The views expressed in this presentation do not necessarily reflect those of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem


Aim of the presentation

- Some personal reflections on global imbalances and the international monetary order
- Based on recent/ongoing research
- Specifically:
 - 1. Is global rebalancing needed? (review of the arguments)
 - 2. (Global) imbalances, crises and reserve accumulation
 - 3. How to proceed: the role of policy coordination




Growing external imbalances

Current account position in selected countries and regions (USD bn)



The role of international trade


China: Net trade contributions to growth (p.p.)



Source: IMF WEO.

The Great Trade Collapse


YoY growth rate of world trade and output (p.c.)



Source: IMF WEO.

The Great Trade Collapse

Figure 2: Growth rate of real imports in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, q-o-q growth rates



Source: Bussière, Callegari, Ghironi, Sestieri and Yamano, 2011.

Why is global rebalancing needed?


Reasons to believe it is the case:

- Risk of global deflationary pressures + risk of protectionism
- Current account reversals are costly
 - > Clear for deficit countries (EME crises of the 1980s & 90s)
 - Also for surplus countries, esp. if reinforced by internal imbalances (investment/lending boom)
 - Global repercussions may be larger due to the internationalization of production chains
- Optimality issue (Lucas paradox)
- Global imbalances and the financial crisis

The protectionist threat

Importance of the word "Protectionism" in the news.

(number of articles including the word "protectionism"; annual frequency between 2000 and 2007, annualised monthly frequency since January 2008)



Source: Dow Jones/Factiva and Bussière, Perez, Straub and Taglioni 2011.

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(Global) imbalances, crises and reserve accumulation

Lessons from early warning signals

Crisis indicators:


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Bussière & Mulder (1999): short-term debt to reserves (Greenspan-Guidotti rule); Bussière & Fratzscher (2006); Bussière (2007), Bussière & Mulder (2011) Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999): reserves; M2/reserves Sachs-Tornell-Velasco (1996): M2/reserves Rose, Eichengren & Wyplosz (1995): growth rate of reserves and of M1/reserves ratio
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
- → Reserve accumulation for insurance motive
- → Note that CA deficit also a usual indicator

Lessons from the 2008 crisis

- Growing empirical literature: Aizenman & Hutchison (2010), Aizenman & Sun (2010), Rose and Spiegel (2010), Frankel and Saravelos (2010), Bussière and Mulder (2011), etc.
- Blanchard, Faruqee & Klyuev (2009)
 - Weak evidence of a link between reserves and the extent of the crisis across countries
 - New IMF instruments could serve as better insurance
 - New SDR allocation
 - New programs (Flexible Credit Line)

Reserves and the crisis





Reserves as insurance instrument

Why it might fail:

- "fear of losing reserves" (Aizenman & Hutchison, 2010, Aizenman & Sun, 2010)
- The "Machlup problem" (no clear benchmark → infinite accumulation)
- Cross-country benchmarks (same implication)
- An important coordination problem (if all reserves are used at the same time)



International implications of fiscal policy

Importance of the Twin Deficit relation

Table 1: A Synthetic Summary of the Literature, Effect of a 1% Increase in the Budget Balance on the Current Account

Empirical Contributions		
Paper (see References)	Sample and Methodology ¹	Result
Summers, 1986	US, 1950-1985, single equations	0.25
Bernheim, 1988	US, UK, Canada, Germany, single equations	0.33 for the US
Roubini, 1988	18 OECD countries, 1961-85, single equations	0.14 (Canada) to 0.60 (US)
Dewald and Ulan, 1990	Same as Roubini 1988 for the US	0
Miller and Russek, 1989	US, Q data, 1971-87, OLS and cointegration	1 or 0 depending on methodology
Enders and Lee, 1990	US, Q data 1947-87, VAR	0
Evans, 1990	G7, Q and annual data, 1973-1988 and other time samples	0 7
Normandin, 1994	US and Canada, Q data 1970-1993	Between 0 and 1 for Canada
		0 for the US
Chinn and Prasad, 2000	18 industrial countries, 1971-1995, Panel regressions	0.34, 0.13, 0.14, and 0.08 depending on specification
Piersanti, 2000	17 OECD countries, 1970-1997, GMM	 0.16 for average of G7 countries
		• 0.25 for the US
Kim and Roubini, 2003	US, Q data, 1973-2002, VAR	<0
Kennedy and Slok, 2005	13 OECD countries, 1982-2003, panel regressions	0.08 to 0.33
	Theoretical Contributions with Simulati	ions
Baxter, 1995	RBC	0.5
Kollman, 1998	RBC	0
Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust, 2005	DSGE	0.2

^{1/} Annual data except where indicated (Q for quarterly data).

Source Bussière, Fratzscher and Mueller, 2010

"Global" liquidity

Discussion on how to measure global liquidity not tackled here

Instead: why concept of "global" liquidity? (BIS):

- Significant share of domestic currency held abroad
- Credit booms and financial inflows
- Issue of currency mismatch

Conclusions

There is a case for global rebalancing and policy cooperation → a multilateral issue

The G20 agenda under the French Presidency:

- Rebalancing issues tackled in the Framework
 WG on Strong, Sustainable & Balanced Growth
- Issues related to the International Monetary System are tackled in the IMS WG, with:
 - A SWG on capital flows
 - A SWG on global liquidity